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ABSTRACT
Influence maximization has found applications in a wide range of
real-world problems, for instance, viral marketing of products in
an online social network, and information propagation of valuable
information such as job vacancy advertisements and health-related
information. While existing algorithmic techniques usually aim at
maximizing the total number of people influenced, the population
often comprises several socially salient groups, e.g., based on gen-
der or race. As a result, these techniques could lead to disparity
across different groups in receiving important information. Fur-
thermore, in many of these applications, the spread of influence
is time-critical, i.e., it is only beneficial to be influenced before a
time deadline. As we show in this paper, the time-criticality of
the information could further exacerbate the disparity of influence
across groups. This disparity, introduced by algorithms aimed at
maximizing total influence, could have far-reaching consequences,
impacting people’s prosperity and putting minority groups at a
big disadvantage. In this work, we propose a notion of group fair-
ness in time-critical influence maximization. We introduce surrogate
objective functions to solve the influence maximization problem
under fairness considerations. By exploiting the submodularity
structure of our objectives, we provide computationally efficient
algorithms with guarantees that are effective in enforcing fairness
during the propagation process. We demonstrate the effectiveness
of our approach through synthetic and real-world experiments.
1 INTRODUCTION
The problem of Influence Maximization has been widely studied due
to its application in multiple domains such as viral marketing [32],
social recommendations [39], propagation of information related to
jobs, financial opportunities or public health programs [3, 38]. The
idea is to identify a set of initial sources (i.e., seed nodes) in a social
network who can influence other people (e.g., by propagating key
information), and traditionally the goal has been to maximize the
total number of people influenced in the process (e.g., who received
the information being propagated) [27].
Real-world social networks, however, are often not homoge-
neous and comprise different groups of people. Due to the disparity
in group sizes and the potentially high propensity towards creat-
ing within-group links (a property known as homophily [29]), the
structure of the social network can cause a disparity in the influ-
ence maximization process. For example, selecting most of the seed
nodes from the majority group might maximize the total number
of influenced nodes, but it is possible that very few members of the
minority group get influenced. In many application scenarios such
as propagation of job or health-related information, such disparity
can end up impacting people’s livelihood and some groups may
become impoverished in the process.
Moreover, some applications are also time-critical in nature [11].
For example, many job applications typically have a deadline by
which one needs to apply; if information related to the application
reaches someone after the deadline, it is not useful. Similarly, in
viral marketing, many companies offer discount deals only for few
days (hours); getting this information late doesn’t serve the recip-
ient(s). More worryingly, if one group of people gets influenced
(i.e., they get the information) faster than other groups, it ends up
exacerbating the inequality in information access. This is possible if
the majority group is better connected than the minority group, and
they are more central in the network. Thus, in time-critical applica-
tion scenarios, focusing on the traditional criteria of maximizing
the number of influenced nodes can have a disparate impact on dif-
ferent groups present in the network. This disparity in time-critical
applications, in turn, can bring minority and under-represented
groups at a big disadvantage with far-reaching consequences. In
this paper, we attempt to mitigate such unfairness in time-critical
influence maximization (TCIM), and we focus on two settings: (i)
where the budget (i.e., the number of seeds) is fixed and the goal
is to find a seed set which maximizes the time-critical influence,
we call this as TCIM-Budget problem, and (ii) where a certain
quota or fraction of the population should be influenced under the
prescribed time deadline, and the goal is to find such a seed set of
minimal size, we call this as TCIM-Cover problem.
1.1 Our Contributions
Our first contribution is to formally introduce the notion of fairness
in time-critical influence maximization, which requires that within
a prescribed time deadline, the fraction of influenced nodes should
be equal across different groups. We highlight, via experiments and
illustrative example, that the standard algorithmic techniques for
solving TCIM-Budget and TCIM-Cover problems lead to unfair
solutions, and the disparity across groups could get worse with
tighter time deadline.
We introduce two formulations of TCIM problems under fair-
ness considerations, namely FairTCIM-Budget and FairTCIM-
Cover. However, directly optimizing FairTCIM-Budget problem
and FairTCIM-Cover problem are computationally challenging,
and comes without any structural properties. As our second con-
tribution, we propose monotone submodular surrogates for solving
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both of these problems that capture the tradeoff between maximiz-
ing total influence and minimizing unfairness (i.e., disparity across
groups). Although the surrogate problems are still NP-Hard, we
propose a greedy approximation with provable guarantees.
We evaluate our approach over both synthetic and real-world
social networks and show that our proposed surrogate objectives
can successfully enforce the aforementioned fairness notion. As
expected, enforcing this fairness comes at the cost of a reduction in
performance i.e., lowering the total influence, in case of FairTCIM-
Budget problem, and solutions with larger seed set sizes, in case of
FairTCIM-Cover problem. However, as guaranteed by our theoret-
ical results, our experiments indeed demonstrate that this cost of
fairness, i.e., reduction in performance, is bounded for our approach.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we briefly review the related literature on influence
maximization and algorithmic fairness.
Influence Maximization. Richardson et al. [32] first introduced
Influence Maximization as an algorithmic problem, and proposed a
heuristic approach to find a set of nodes whose initial adoption of a
certain idea/product can maximize the number of further adopters.
Over the years, extensive research efforts have focused on the cas-
cading behavior, diffusion and spreading of ideas, or containment of
diseases by identifying the set of influential nodes which maximizes
the influence through a network [22, 25, 26, 32, 37].
Typically, identifying the most influential nodes is studied in
two ways: (i) using network structural properties to find the set
of most central nodes [22, 23], and (ii) formulating the problem as
discrete optimization [2, 19, 22]. Kempe et al. [22] studied influence
maximization under different social contagion models and showed
that submodularity of the influence function can be used to obtain
provable approximation guarantees. Since then, there has been a
large body of work studying various extensions [5, 7, 8, 19]. How-
ever, the notion of fairness in the influence maximization problem
has not been studied by this line of previous works.
Fairness in Algorithmic Decision Making. Recently a growing
amount of work has focused on bias and unfairness in algorith-
mic decision-making systems [9, 10, 34]. The aim here is to exam-
ine and mitigate unfair decisions that may lead to discrimination.
Fairness has been divided into two broad areas: individual and
group-level fairness. The notion of individual fairness, first pro-
posed by Dwork et al. [13], requires that similar individuals who
have similar attributes to be treated similarly. Whereas, the con-
cept of Demographic Parity falls into a larger category called group
fairness [20], which requires that the outcomes of an algorithm
should equally benefit different groups with different sensitive at-
tributes (e.g., groups based on race, gender or age) [17, 21]. Although
fairness along different dimensions of political science, moral phi-
losophy, economics, and law [12, 14, 33, 35] has been extensively
studied, only a few contemporary works have investigated fairness
in influence maximization, as described next.
Contemporary Works. Very recently, Fish et al. [18] proposed
a notion of individual fairness in information access, but did not
consider the group fairness aspects. In addition, some prior works
have proposed constrained optimization problems to encourage
diversity in selecting the most influential nodes [1, 4, 6, 15].
In a concurrent work, Tsang et al. [36] propose a method to
achieve group fairness in influence maximization. However, their
work is very different from our approach in three ways: i) they
propose a different problem formulation with objective that does
not have submodular structural properties, ii) they only study the
problem under budget constraint, and iii) they do not consider
the time-critical aspect of influence in their definition of fairness
for influence maximization. This could result in majority groups
being influenced before the minority, and can lead to disparity
in applications where the timing of being influenced/informed is
critical. In our work, we introduce a submodular objective that
directly addresses the time-criticality in influence maximization
problem under budget constraint as well as coverage constraint.
3 BACKGROUND ON TIME-CRITICAL
INFLUENCE MAXIMIZATION (TCIM)
In this section, we provide the necessary background on the prob-
lem of time-critical influence maximization (henceforth, referred
to as TCIM for brevity). First, we formally introduce a well-studied
influence propagation model and specify the notion of time-critical
influence that we consider in this paper. Then, we discuss two
discrete optimization formulations to tackle the TCIM problem.
3.1 Influence Propagation in Social Network
Consider a directed graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of
nodes and E is the set of directed edges connecting these nodes.
For instance, in a social network the nodes could represent people
and edges could represent friendship links between people. An
undirected link between two nodes can be represented by simply
considering two directed edges between these nodes.
There are two classical influence propogation models that are
studied in the literature [22]: (i) Independent Cascade model (IC)
and (ii) Linear Threshold (LT) model. In this paper, we will consider
IC model and our results can easily be extended to the LT model.
In the IC model, there is a probability of influence associated
with each edge denoted as pE := {pe ∈ [0, 1] : e ∈ E}. Given
an initial seed set S ⊆ V , the influence propagation proceeds in
discrete time steps t = {0, 1, 2, . . . , } as follows. At t = 0, the initial
seed set S is “activated" (i.e., influenced). Then, at any time step
t > 0, a nodev ∈ V which was activated at time t − 1 gets a chance
to influence its neighbors (i.e., set of nodes {w : (v,w) ∈ E}). The
influence propagation process stops at time t > 0 if no new nodes
get influenced at this time. Under the IC model, once a node is
activated it stays active throughout the process and each node has
only one chance to influence it’s neighbors.
Note that the influence propagation under IC model is a stochas-
tic process: the stochasticity here arises because of the random out-
comes of a nodev influencing its neighborw based on the Bernoulli
distribution p(v,w ). An outcome of the influence propagation pro-
cess can be denoted via a set of timestamps {tv ≥ 0 : v ∈ V} where
tv represents the time at which a node v ∈ V was activated. We
have tv = 0 iff v ∈ S and for convenience of notation, we define
tv = −1 to indicate that the nodev was not activated in the process.
2
3.2 Utility of Time-Critical Influence
As motivated in the introduction, we focus on the application set-
tings where the spread of influence is time-critical, i.e., it is more
beneficial to be influenced earlier in the process. In particular, we
adopt the well-studied notion of time-critical influence as proposed
by Chen et al. [11]. Their time-critical model is captured via a dead-
line τ : If a node is activated before the deadline, it receives a utility
of 1, otherwise it receives no utility. This simple model captures the
notion of timing in many important real-world applications such
as viral marketing of an online product with limited availability,
information propagation of job vacancy information, etc.
Given the influence propagation model and the notion of time-
critical aspect via a deadline τ , we quantify the utility of time-critical
influence for a given seed set S on a set of target nodes Y ⊆ V via
the following:
fτ (S ;Y ,G) = E
[ ∑
v ∈Y ,tv ≥0
I(tv ≤ τ )
]
, (1)
where the expectation is w.r.t. the randomness of the outcomes of
the ICmodel. The function is parametrized by deadline τ , setY ⊆ V
representing the set of nodes over which the utility is measured
(by default, one can consider Y = V), and the underlying graph
G along with edge activation probabilities pE . Given a fixed value
of these parameters, the utility function fτ : 2V → R≥0 is a set
function defined over the seed set S ⊆ V . Note that the constraint
tv ≥ 0 represents the node was activated and the constraint tv ≤ τ
represents that the activation happened before the deadline τ .
3.3 TCIM as Discrete Optimization Problem
Next, we present two settings under which we study TCIM by
casting it as a discrete optimization problem.
3.3.1 Maximization under Budget Constraint (TCIM-Budget). In
the maximization problem under budget constraint, we are given
a fixed budget B > 0 and the goal is to find an optimal set of seed
nodes that maximize the expected utility. Formally, we state the
problem as
max
S ⊆V
fτ (S ;V,G) subject to |S | ≤ B (P1)
3.3.2 Minimization under Coverage Constraint (TCIM-Cover). In
the minimization problem under coverage constraint, we are given
a quota Q ∈ [0, 1] representing the minimal fraction of nodes that
must be activated or “covered" by the influence propagation in
expectation. The goal is then to find an optimal set of seeds of
minimal size that achieves the desired coverage constraint. We
formally state the problem as
min
S ⊆V
|S | subject to fτ (S ;V,G)|V| ≥ Q (P2)
3.4 Submodularity and Approximate Solutions
Next, we present some key properties of the utility function fτ (.)
to get a better understanding of the above-mentioned optmization
problems. In their seminal work, Kempe et al. [22] showed that the
utility function without time-critical deadline, i.e., f∞(.) : S → R+,
is a non-negative, monotone, submodular set function w.r.t. the
optimization variable S ⊆ V . Chen et al. [11] showed that the
utility function for the general time-critical setting for any τ also
satisfies these properties. Submodularity is an intuitive notion of
diminishing returns, stating that, for any sets A ⊆ A′ ⊆ V , and
any node a ∈ V \A′, it holds that (omitting the parametersV and
G for brevity):
fτ (A ∪ {a}) − fτ (A) ≥ fτ (A′ ∪ {a}) − fτ (A′)
The fact that the utility function is submodular in turn implies
that these two problems P1 and P2 are NP-Hard and hence finding
the optimization solution is intractable [16, 24, 31]. However, on a
positive note, one can exploit the submodularity property of the
function to design efficient approximation algorithms with provable
guarantees [24, 31]. In particular, we can run the following greedy
heuristic: start from an empty set, iteratively add a new node to
the set that provides the maximal marginal gain in terms of utility,
and stop the algorithm when the desired constraint on budget
or coverage is met. This greedy algorithm provides the following
guarantees for these two problems:.
• for the TCIM-Budget problem P1, the greedy algorithm
returns a set Sˆ that guarantees the following lower bound
on the utility: fτ (Sˆ ;V,G) ≥ (1− 1e ) · fτ (S∗;V,G) where S∗
is an optimal solution to problem P1.
• for the TCIM-Cover problem P2, the greedy algorithm re-
turns a set Sˆ that guarantees the following upper bound on
the seed set size: |Sˆ | ≤ ln(1+ |V|)· |S∗ | where S∗ is an optimal
solution to problem P2.
4 DISPARITY IN TCIM AND INTRODUCING
NOTIONS OF FAIRNESS
In this section, we highlight the disparity in utility across popu-
lation resulting from the solution to the standard TCIM problem
formulations, and introduce a notion of fairness in TCIM.
4.1 Socially Salient Groups and Their Utilities
The current approaches to TCIM consider all the nodes in V to
be homogeneous. We capture the presence of different socially
salient groups in the population by dividing individuals into k
disjoint groups. Here, socially salient groups could be based on
some sensitive attribute such as gender or race. We denote the set
of nodes in each group i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,k} asVi ⊆ V , and we have
V = ∪iVi . For any given seed set S , we define the utilities for a
group i as fτ (S ;Vi ,G) by setting target nodes Y = Vi in Eq. 1.
4.2 Disparity in Utility Across Groups
In the standard formulations for TCIM problem, i.e., TCIM-Budget
problem P1 and TCIM-Cover problem P2, the utility fτ (S ;V,G) is
optimized for the whole populationV without considering their
groups. Clearly, a solution to TCIM problem can, in general, lead
to high disparity in utilities of different groups.
In particular, this disparity in utility across groups arises from
several factors in which two groups differ from each other. One of
the factors is that the groups are of different sizes, i.e., one group is
a minority. The different group sizes could, in turn, lead to selecting
seed nodes from the majority group when optimizing for utility
fτ (S ;V,G) in problems P1 and P2. Another factor is related to
the connectivity and centrality of nodes from different groups. The
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S
f (S ;V,G)
|V |
f (S ;V1,G)
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f (S ;V2,G)
|V2 | S
f (S ;V,G)
|V |
f (S ;V1,G)
|V1 |
f (S ;V2,G)
|V2 |
τ = ∞ {a,b} 0.38 0.48 0.16 {a, c} 0.31 0.33 0.27
τ = 4 {a,b} 0.32 0.44 0.08 {d, e} 0.25 0.26 0.22
τ = 2 {a,b} 0.24 0.36 0.00 {a, c} 0.21 0.22 0.18
Figure 1: An example to illustrate the disparity across groups in the standard approaches to TCIM. (Left) Graph with |V | = 38 nodes belonging
to two groups shown in “blue dots" ( |V1 | = 26) and “red triangles" ( |V2 | = 12). (Right) We compare an optimal solution to the standard TCIM-
Budget problem P1 and an optimal solution to our formulation of TCIM-Budget with fairness considerations given by FairTCIM-Budget
problem P4. For different time critical deadlines τ , normalized utilities are reported for the whole population V, for the “blue dots" group
V1, and for the “red triangles" group V2. As τ reduces, the disparity between groups is further exacerbated in the solution to TCIM-Budget
problem P1. Solution to FairTCIM-Budget problem P4 achieves high utility and low disparity for different time critical deadlines τ .
solution to the optimization problems P1 and P2 tend to favor nodes
which are more central and have high-connectivity. Finally, given
the above two factors, we note that the disparity in influence across
groups can be further exacerbated for lower values of deadline τ in
the time-critical influence maximization.
In Figure 1, we provide an example to illustrate the disparity
across groups in the standard approaches to TCIM. In particular,
to show this disparity, we consider the TCIM-Budget problem P1,
and it is easy to extend this example to show disparity in TCIM-
Cover problem P2. The graph that we consider in this example (see
Figure 1 caption for details) has the two characteristic properties
that we discussed above: (i) group V2 is in minority with less than
half of the size of group V1, (ii) group V1 has more central nodes
compared to group V2, and (iii) nodes in group V1 have higher
connectivity than nodes in group V2. We consider the probability
of influence in the graph to be pe = 0.7 for all edges, and study the
optimization problem P1 for budget B = 2.
For different time critical deadlines τ , we report the follow-
ing normalized utilities: f (S ;V,G)|V | for the whole population V ,
f (S ;V1,G)
|V1 | for the groupV1, and
f (S ;V2,G)
|V2 | for the groupV2. Here,
normalization captures the notion of “average" utility per node in a
group, and automatically allows us to account for the differences
in the group sizes. As can be seen in Figure 1, the optimal solution
to the problem consistently picks set S = {a,b} comprising of the
most central and high-connectivity nodes. While these nodes maxi-
mize the total utility, they lead to a high disparity in the normalized
utilities across groups. As the influence becomes more time-critical,
i.e., τ is reduced, we see an increasing disparity as discussed above.
For τ = 2, the utility of groupV2 reduces to 0.
4.3 Notion of Fairness
Next, in order to guide the design of fair solutions to TCIM prob-
lems, we introduce a formal notion of group fairness in TCIM. In
particular, we measure the (un-)fairness or disparity of an algorithm
by the maximum disparity in normalized utilities across all pairs of
socially salient groups, given by:
max
i, j ∈{1,2, ...,k }
 fτ (S ;Vi ,G)|Vi | − fτ (S ;Vj ,G)|Vj |
 (2)
As discussed above (see Section 4.2), normalization w.r.t. group
sizes captures the notion of average utility per node in a group and
hence makes the measure agnostic to the group size. In the next
section, we seek to design fair algorithms for TCIM problems that
have low disparity (or more fairness) as measured by Eq. 2.
5 ACHIEVING FAIRNESS IN TCIM
In this section, we seek to develop efficient algorithms for TCIM
problems under fairness considerations that have low disparity
measured by Eq. 2 while maintaining high performance.
5.1 Fair Maximization under Budget
Constraint (FairTCIM-Budget)
5.1.1 Introducing fairness considerations in TCIM-Budget. A fair
TCIM algorithm under budget constraint should seek to achieve
the following two objectives: (i) maximizing total influence for the
whole population V as was done in the standard TCIM-Budget
problem P1, and (ii) enforcing fairness by ensuring that disparity
across different groups as per Eq. 2 is low. Clearly, enforcing fairness
would lead to a reduction in total influence, and we seek to design
algorithms that can achieve a good trade-off between these two
objectives.We formulate the following fair variant of TCIM-Budget
problem P1 that captures this trade-off:
max
S ⊆V
(
fτ (S ;V,G) − γ ·max
i, j
 fτ (S ;Vi ,G)|Vi | − fτ (S ;Vj ,G)|Vj | 
)
(P3)
subject to |S | ≤ B
where γ ≥ 0 is a fixed regularization factor to trade-off the total
influence and disparity of the solution.
5.1.2 Surrogate problem for FairTCIM-Budget with guarantees.
We note that problem P3 is a challenging discrete optimization prob-
lem and the objective function does not have structural properties
of submodularity as was the case for the standard TCIM-Budget
problem P1. Instead of directly solving problem P3, we introduce a
novel surrogate problem that would allow us to indirectly trade-off
the two objectives of maximizing total influence and minimizing
disparity across groups, as follows:
max
S ⊆V
k∑
i=1
λiH(fτ (S ;Vi ,G)) subject to |S | ≤ B (P4)
whereH is a non-negative, monotone concave function and λi ≥ 0
are fixed scalars.
4
The key idea of using the surrogate objective function in prob-
lem P4 is the following: Passing the group influence functions
through a monotone concave functionH rewards selecting seeds
that would lead to higher influence on under-represented groups
early in the selection process; this in turn helps in reducing dis-
parity across groups. It is important to note that controlling the
curvature of the concave functionH provides an indirect way to
trade-off the total influence and the disparity of the solution. For
instance, using H(z) := log(z) has higher curvature than using
H(z) := √z and hence leads to lower disparity (this is demon-
strated in the experimental results in Figure 2a). For our illustrative
example from Section 4, we report the results for an optimal so-
lution to FairTCIM-Budget problem P4 withH(z) := log(z). As
can be seen in Figure 1, the solution leads to a drastic reduction in
disparity across groups for different values of deadline τ compared
to an optimal solution of the standard TCIM-Budget problem P1.
While it is intuitively clear that using the concave functionH(z)
in problem P4 reduces disparity, we also need to ensure that the
solution to this problem has high influence for the whole population
V and that the solution can be computed efficiently. As proven
in the theorem below, we can find an approximate solution to
problem P4, with guarantees on the total influence, by running the
greedy heuristic (as was introduced in Section 3.4).
Theorem 1. Let Sˆ denote the output of the greedy algorithm for
problem P4 with λi = 1 ∀i ∈ [k]. Let S∗ be an optimal solution
to problem P1. Then, the total influence of the greedy algorithm is
guaranteed to have the following lower bound: fτ (Sˆ ;V,G) ≥ (1 −
1
e ) · H
(
fτ (S∗;V,G)
)
.
This is equivalent to the fact that the multiplicative approxi-
mation factor of the utility of FairTCIM-Budget using greedy
algorithm w.r.t. the utility of an optimal solution to TCIM-Budget
scales as
((1 − 1e ) · H(fτ (S∗;V,G))fτ (S∗;V,G) ) . Note that as the curvature of
the concave functionH increases, the approximation factor gets
worse—this further highlights how the curvature of the functionH
provides a way to trade-off the total influence and disparity of the
solution. We omit the detailed proofs due to lack of space, instead
provide a sketch of the key ideas used in the proof.
Proof sketch. There are two key steps in proving the above
theorem. The first step is showing that the objective function in
problem P4 is monotone submodular function, where we use a
result from [28] that composition of a non-decreasing concave and
a non-decreasing submodular function is submodular. The second
step is to bound the utility of the optimal solution of problem P4
w.r.t. the optimal solution of problem P1. We prove that this can
be bounded by a multiplicative factor of H(fτ (S
∗;V,G))
fτ (S∗;V,G) . Combining
bounds from individual steps and by applying inequalities resulting
from the concavity ofH gives us the final result. □
5.2 Fair Minimization under Coverage
Constraint (FairTCIM-Cover)
5.2.1 Introducing fairness considerations in TCIM-Cover. A fair
TCIM algorithm under coverage constraint should seek to achieve
the following two objectives: (i) minimizing the size of the seed set
that achieves the desired coverage constraint as was done in the
standard TCIM-Cover problem P2, and (ii) enforcing fairness by
ensuring that disparity across different groups as per Eq. 2 is low.
As was the case for FairTCIM-Budget problem above, enforcing
fairness would lead to increasing the size of the required seed set,
and we seek to design algorithms that can achieve a good trade-
off between these two objectives. We formulate a fair variant of
TCIM-Cover problem P2 that captures this trade-off as follows:
min
S ⊆V
(
|S | + γ ·max
i, j
 fτ (S ;Vi ,G)|Vi | − fτ (S ;Vj ,G)|Vj | 
)
(P5)
subject to fτ (S ;V,G)|V| ≥ Q
where γ ≥ 0 is a fixed regularization factor to trade-off the size
of seed set and disparity of the solution.
5.2.2 Surrogate problem for FairTCIM-Cover with guarantees. As
in Section 5.1, we note that problem P5 is a challenging discrete
optimization problem and does not have structural properties as
was the case for the standard TCIM-Cover problem P2. Instead
of directly solving problem P5, we introduce a novel surrogate
problem that indirectly trade-offs the two objectives of minimizing
the size of selected seed set and minimizing disparity, as follows:
min
S ⊆V
|S | subject to
k∑
i=1
min
{
fτ (S ;Vi ,G)
|Vi | ,Q
}
≥ k ·Q (P6)
The key idea of using the surrogate objective function in prob-
lem P6 is the following: the problem has a constraint that enforces
that at least Q fraction of nodes in each group are influenced by
the selected seed set S ; this in turn directly provides a bound on
the disparity of any feasible solution to the problem as (1 −Q).
While it is intuitively clear that the solution to problem P6 re-
duces disparity, we also would like to bound the size of the final seed
set and that the solution can be computed efficiently. As proven in
the theorem below, we can find an approximate solution to prob-
lem P6, with guarantees on the final seed set size, by running the
greedy heuristic (as was introduced in Section 3.4).
Theorem 2. Let us denote the output of the greedy algorithm for
problem P6 by set Sˆ . For group i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, let S∗i denote an optimal
solution to the coverage problem P2 for the target nodes set toVi , i.e.,
solving problem P2with constraint given by fτ (S ;Vi ,G)|Vi | ≥ Q . Then, the
size of the seed set Sˆ returned by the greedy algorithm is guaranteed
to have the following upper bound: |Sˆ | ≤ ln(1 + |V|)
( ∑k
i=1 |S∗i |
)
.
Proof sketch. There are two key steps in proving the above
theorem. The first step is showing that the objective function in
the constraint of problem P6 is monotone submodular function
by using several composition properties of submodular functions
[24]. The second step is to provide an upper bound on the optimal
solution of problem P6 as
( ∑k
i=1 |S∗i |
)
. □
6 EVALUATION ON SYNTHETIC DATASET
In this section, we compare the solutions of different problems on
a synthetic dataset. We show the effects of different properties of
the synthetic graph and parameters of the algorithms.
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Figure 2: [Synthetic Dataset: Budget Problem] The figures show that solving TCIM-Budget problem P1 can lead to disparity in number of
influenced nodes belonging to different groups, while FairTCIM-Budget problem P4 fares better in terms of achieving parity of influence,
with marginally lower total influence. See Section 6.2 for further details.
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Figure 3: [Synthetic Dataset: Budget Problem] These figures demonstrate that lower activation probabilities, uneven group sizes, and cliquish-
ness can lead to higher disparity of influence between different groups with TCIM-Budget problem P1. In comparison our proposed method,
FairTCIM-Budget given by problem P4, leads to solutions which yield lower disparity. For further details, see Section 6.2.
6.1 Dataset and Experimental Setup
First, we discuss the synthetic dataset generation process and the
setup used in our experiments.
Synthetic dataset. We consider an undirected graph with 500
nodes, where each node belongs to either groupV1 or groupV2.
The fraction of nodes belonging to each group is determined by a
parameter д (e.g., setting д = 0.7 results in 70% of the nodes to be
randomly assigned to groupV1). Nodes are connected based on two
probabilities: (i) within-group edge probability (Homophily) phom
and (ii) across-group edge probability (Heterophily) phet . Placing
an edge between two nodes goes as follows: given a pair of nodes
(v,w), if they belong to the same group, we perform a Bernoulli
trial with parameter phom ; otherwise we use the parameter phet .
If the outcome of the trial is 1, we place an undirected edge e
between these two nodes. Each edge has a probability of activation,
pe ∈ [0, 1], with which the nodes can activate each other.
Experimental Setup. In our experiments, we used д = 0.7 yield-
ing 350 nodes in V1 and 150 nodes in V2. We set phom = 0.025
and phet = 0.001, which yielded 3606 total edges, out of which
2965 edges were within group V1, 514 within V2, and 127 edges
connecting nodes across two groups. We used a constant activation
probability on all edges given by pe = 0.05. Finally, we consider the
time deadline τ = 20, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Evaluating
utilities, as described in Eq. 1, in closed form is intractable, so we
used Monte Carlo sampling to estimate these utilities. We used 200
samples for this estimation, which yielded a stable estimation of
the utility function. In all the experiments, we pick a seed set by
solving the corresponding problem. Then, we use this seed set to es-
timate the expected number of nodes influenced in the graph using
TCIM. We report the following normalized utilities: f (S ;V,G)|V | for
the whole populationV , f (S ;V1,G)|V1 | for the groupV1, and
f (S ;V2,G)
|V2 |
for the groupV2.
6.2 TCIM under Budget Constraints
Next, we compare the solutions of TCIM-Budget problem P1 with
our solution to FairTCIM-Budget problem P4, obtained through
the greedy algorithm, i.e., by greedily picking B seeds which max-
imize the objective functions. In all the figures discussed in this
section, red color represents the results of TCIM-Budget prob-
lem P1, and blue color represents the results of our solution to the
FairTCIM-Budget problem P4. For the experiments in this section,
we used a budget of B = 30 seeds.
Effect of different H(z). Figure 2a presents the comparison of
three algorithms: one solving TCIM-Budget problem P1, using
the greedy heuristic; the other two solving FairTCIM-Budget
problem P4, where we use two realizations of the concavemonotone
function, H(z), given by: (i) H(z) := log(z) and (ii) H(z) := √z.
Figure 2a shows the fraction of population influenced, both overall
and for every group. We can observe that solving the traditional
TCIM-Budget problem leads to large disparity between the fraction
of nodes influenced from each group: while 30% of nodes in group
V1 are influenced, this fraction is only 2% for groupV2.
On the other hand, our proposed solution to FairTCIM-Budget
problem results in lower disparity between the groups, ensuring
similar fraction of influenced nodes. We can further see that
√
z
performs worse than log(z) in removing the disparity, however
incurring lower loss in total influence, which is expected as it has
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Figure 4: [Synthetic Dataset: Cover Problem] These figures show a comparison of TCIM-Cover problem P2, in red, and FairTCIM-Cover
problem P6, in blue. They show that FairTCIM-Cover achieves lower disparity of influence between different groups with slightly bigger
solution set sizes. See Section 6.3 for further details.
lower curvature than log(z). One could consider higher powers
of the root to increase the curvature or increase the weights λ
in problem P4 for the under-represented group. The key point to
notice is that the reduction in the total influence is only marginal
as guaranteed by Theorem 1. In the subsequent figures, we only
show the results ofH(z) := log(z) for the solution to problem P4.
Effect of seed budget. Figure 2b shows the effect of different
seed budgets on the number of influenced nodes (from different
groups). Dotted and dash-dotted lines correspond to groupsV2 and
V1 respectively, while solid lines represent the total influence. We
can see that problem P4, with a small reduction in total influence,
reduces a lot of disparity between the groups. We also observe that
higher budget could lead to more disparity in an imbalanced graph.
Effect of deadline. Figure 2c compares disparity as we vary the
value of the deadline τ , in problems P1 and P4. Disparity is com-
puted as the absolute difference between the fraction of individuals
influenced in each group, given by Eq. 2. The figure shows that the
disparity depends on the value of τ and, in this case, our method is
more effective for lower values of τ .
Effect of activation probabilities. Figure 3a shows the disparity
in influence for different activation probabilitiespe ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.1,
0.2, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 1.0}. The results show that lower values of τ and
lower activation probabilities could result in larger disparity and
our method consistently performs better.
Effect of group sizes. Figure 3b shows the effect of group sizesд ∈
{0.55, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8}. x-axis represents ratio of the nodes belonging to
different groups and y-axis represents disparity. The figure confirms
our hypothesis that imbalance in a graph could lead to disparate
influence, as motivated in the illustrative example given in Figure 1.
Effect of graph structure. Figure 3c demonstrates the importance
of the graph structure (phet ,phom ) ∈ {(0.025, 0.025), (0.015, 0.025),
(0.01, 0.025), (0.001, 0.025)}. x-axis shows the ratio of across and
within group edge probabilities. The figure validates our hypothesis
that the majority group containing more influential nodes fares
better in TCIM-Budget problem, as proposed in Figure 1.
Takeaways. In this section we demonstrated that: (i) solving TCIM-
Budget problem can lead to disparity of influence in different
groups; (ii) the amount of disparity depends on the time limit,
activation probability, relative group sizes, budget, and connectivity
of the graph; and (iii) instead, solving FairTCIM-Budget results
in lower disparity of influence, with marginal reduction in overall
influence, as guaranteed by Theorem 1.
6.3 TCIM under Coverage Constraints
Next, we compare solutions of TCIM-Cover problem P2, and our
solution to FairTCIM-Cover problem P6. The goal is to reach the
prescribed quota Q , while trying to minimize the number of seeds.
In all the figures discussed in this section, red color represents the
results of TCIM-Cover problem P2, and blue color represents the
results of our solution to FairTCIM-Cover problem P6.
Effect of iterations. Figure 4a shows how the fraction of popula-
tion influenced changes with seed selection at each iteration. Solid
lines represent total influence while dash-dotted lines and dotted
lines represent groupsV1 andV2, respectively. In this experiment,
Q was set to 0.2 which is represented by the horizontal green line.
The figure demonstrates that in FairTCIM-Cover, the fraction of
influenced individuals are more thanQ in both groups. On the other
hand, in the TCIM-Cover, the fraction of influenced individuals
in groupV1 is larger than Q ; however, the fraction of influenced
individuals in group V2 is much smaller than Q . The figure also
shows that this fairness is achieved with only marginal increase in
the solution set sizes, as guaranteed in Theorem 2.
Effect of quota Q. Figure 4b shows fractions of individuals that are
influenced for different quota Q : (i) for the TCIM-Cover problem,
the disparity in the fraction of influenced individuals in different
groups persists with increased quota; (ii) however, our proposed
method results in both groups reaching the specified coverage Q .
Figure 4c shows the coverage Q on the x-axis and number of seeds
used on the y-axis. The figure shows that our method results in only
slightly larger seed sets compared to the TCIM-Cover problem, as
guaranteed by Theorem 2.
Takeaways. We compared the results of TCIM-Cover problem,
P2, and our solution to FairTCIM-Cover problem, P6. The results
demonstrate that: (i) both methods influence Q fraction of the total
population; (ii) however, the TCIM-Cover approach can result in
disparate coverage, i.e., the coverage in some groups could be much
lower than the prescribed fractionQ ; (iii) FairTCIM-Cover, on the
other hand, ensures coverage of at least Q fraction in both groups;
and (iv) additionally, FairTCIM-Cover only yields slightly larger
solution set sizes, as guaranteed by Theorem 2.
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Figure 5: [Rice-Facebook Dataset: Budget Problem] These figures show similar results as in Figure 2, on real-world data. They demonstrate
that our proposedmethods yields seed set which propagate influence in amore fair manner, while incurring very small cost of total influence.
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Figure 6: [Rice-FacebookDataset: Cover Problem] These figures demonstrate that our proposedmethods are effective in propagating influence
fairly in TCIM problem with coverage constraints. The results are similar to Figure 4, but on real-world data.
7 EVALUATION ON REAL-WORLD DATASET
In this section, we first discuss the details of the experiments and
then demonstrate results using a real-world dataset.
7.1 Dataset and Experimental Setup
Next, we describe the dataset we used to evaluate our proposed
methods, followed by the experimental setup.
Rice-Facebook dataset. To evaluate our proposed methods, we
used Rice-Facebook dataset collected by Mislove et al. [30], where
they capture the connections between students at the Rice Uni-
versity. The resulting network consists of 1205 nodes and 42443
undirected edges. Each node has 3 attributes: (i) the residential
college id (a number between [1 − 9]), (ii) age (a number between
[18 − 22]), and (iii) a major ID (which is in the range [1 − 60]).
We grouped the nodes (students) into two groups based on their
age attributes. We considered nodes with ages 18 and 19 as group
V1 and age above 20 as groupV2. GroupV1 has 97 nodes and 513
within group edges. On the other hand, group V2 has 344 nodes
and 7441 within group edges. Overall, there are 3350 across group
edges going between nodes inV1 andV2.
Experimental Setup. In all the experiments in this section, we
used activation probability pe = 0.01. All the other parameter were
the same as described in Section 6.1.
7.2 TCIM under Budget Constraint
We perform same experiments as done in Section 6.2 on the Rice-
Facebook dataset, using the same settings as in Section 6.2.
In Figure 5a, we compare the results of TCIM-Budget prob-
lem P1 and FairTCIM-Budget problem P4 using two realizations
ofH(z), given by: (i)H(z) := log(z) and (ii)H(z) := √z. The figure
demonstrates that: (i) At a marginal reduction of total influence, our
proposed method reduces disparity in influence, as guaranteed by
Theorem 1; (ii) as hypothesized in Section 5.1, a higher curvature
function, H(z) := log(z), leads to a bigger reduction in disparity
compared toH(z) := √z, also on a real-word dataset.
x-axis in Figure 5b represents the seed budget allowed. The y-axis
shows the fraction of the population influenced/activated. Groups
V1 andV2 are represented by dash-dotted lines and dotted lines
respectively and solid lines correspond to total influence. The figure
demonstrates that: (i) FairTCIM-Budget problem results in less
disparity of average group influence compared to TCIM-Budget
problem; (ii) the reduction in disparity is achieved at a very low
cost to the total influence.
Figure 5c represents different time deadlines on the x-axis and
disparity, as calculated by Eq. 2, on the y-axis. We can see that (i) our
proposed method yields solutions which result in lower disparity,
and (ii) the disparity is dependent on the time deadline.
Takeaways. We demonstrated that: (i) FairTCIM-Budget, our
proposed method, yields less disparate solutions; (ii) this fairness is
achieved at a very small reduction of the total influence, compared
to TCIM-Budget problem, as guaranteed by Theorem1; and (iii) the
disparity of influence is higher for bigger time deadlines, and unlike
in the synthetic dataset our method is also effective in removing
disparity for the higher time deadlines on this real-world data.
7.3 TCIM under Coverage Constraint
The experiments done in this section are the same as described in
Section 6.3, except that we use Rice-Facebook dataset. Figures 6a, 6b,
and 6c show similar results as Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c.
Takeaways.We compared the result of TCIM-Cover problem P2
and our solution to FairTCIM-Cover problem P6. The results show
that: (i) both methods reach the same fraction of the population; (ii)
only FairTCIM-Cover problem results in seed sets influencing the
required quota in all the groups; and (iii) lastly, FairTCIM-Cover
yields only slightly larger solution sets as guaranteed by Theorem 2.
8
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered the important problem of time-critical
influence maximization (TCIM) under (i) budget constraint (TCIM-
Budget) and (ii) coverage constraint (TCIM-Cover). We showed
that the existing algorithmic techniques aimed at maximizing to-
tal influence in the population could lead to a huge disparity in
utility across the underlying groups. This can put minority groups
at a big disadvantage with far-reaching consequences. To ensure
that different groups are fairly treated, we proposed a notion of
fairness and formulated two novel problems to solve TCIM under
fairness considerations, namely, FairTCIM-Budget and FairTCIM-
Cover. By introducing surrogate objective functions with submod-
ular structural properties, we provided computationally efficient
algorithms with desirable guarantees. Experiments over synthetic
and a real-world datasets demonstrated that our algorithms lead to
low disparity in the time-critical influence propagation. This work
opens up a variety of new research problems, including extensions
to different notions of fairness, considering more complex models
of time-criticality in information propagation (such as discounting
with time), and developing new optimization methods for solving
the fair TCIM problem formulations.
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